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PROTECTING STUDENTS, PROTECTING CONSUMERS: 
A NEW FEDERAL REGULATION OF THE FOR-PROFIT 
DISTANCE LEARNING INDUSTRY 
 
Menesha Mannapperuma* 
 
 
The rise of online distance learning portends new promises of a 
college degree for students who are less likely to attend a traditional 
two- or four-year college or university. Online for-profit educational 
institutions have rushed to meet the needs of these students. However, the 
for-profit distance learning industry, generally lightly regulated from its 
inception, has been dogged with accusations that it places profits before 
the interests of its students. While a system of proposed regional 
interstate compacts promise to standardize oversight of the for-profit 
distance learning industry, it fails to include states that regulate the 
industry the least and thus fails to protect students who are most likely to 
need protection. This Article proposes a modification to the interstate 
compact system: by tying federal Title IV funds to consumer protection 
efforts, the regional interstate compacts can standardize regulation of 
the for-profit distance learning industry while providing students with 
basic consumer protections that can help rectify the most egregious 
problems associated with the for-profit distance learning industry. 
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INTRODUCTION 
For thousands of years, most interactive learning has been 
through face-to-face interactions between students and instructors. 
With the rise of distance learning during the mid-nineteenth 
century, this began to change. Students began taking 
“correspondence courses” through which they used the postal 
service to receive lessons and submit their work for grading.1 Now, 
a new revolution is taking place in the distance learning industry. 
The ubiquity of Internet technology in recent years has made 
distance learning easier than ever.2 The ease with which this 
technology allows students to access a professor or course has 
resulted in a proliferation of online courses, often as part of degree-
granting programs offered by for-profit universities.3  Distance 
                                                            
1 What is Distance Learning?: History of Distance Learning,  CAL. 
DISTANCE LEARNING PROJECT, http://www.cdlponline.org/index.cfm? 
fuseaction=whatis&pg=3 (last visited Feb. 7, 2015) [hereinafter CAL. DISTANCE 
LEARNING PROJECT, What is Distance Learning?]. 
2 This Article will focus on for-profit higher education institutions that 
offer distance learning courses. However, prominent universities such as 
Stanford offer free online courses to the general public, with Stanford’s five free 
online courses garnering more than 335,000 participants in the spring of 2012. 
Jamie Beckett, Stanford Offers More Free Online Courses for the World, 
STANFORD NEWS (Mar. 6, 2012), http://news.stanford.edu/news/2012/march/ 
online-courses-mitchell-030612.html. In May 2012, Harvard and Massachusetts 
Institute of Technology announced the formation of a nonprofit partnership, 
edX, to offer free online courses from both universities. Tamar Lewin, Harvard 
and MIT Team Up to Offer Free Online Courses, N.Y. TIMES (May 2, 2012), 
http://www.nytimes.com/2012/05/03/education/harvard-and-mit-team-up-to-
offer-free-online-courses.html. 
3  
In 2007–08, about 4.3 million undergraduate students, or 20 
percent of all undergraduates, took at least one distance 
education course.  About 0.8 million, or 4 percent of all 
undergraduates, took their entire program through distance 
education . . . . In addition to these undergraduate students, 
about 0.8 million, or 22 percent, of all postbaccalaureate 
students took distance education courses in 2007–08. The 
percentage of postbaccalaureate students who took their entire 
program through distance education (9 percent) was higher 
than the percentage at the undergraduate level.  
Fast Facts: Distance Learning, NAT’L. CTR. FOR EDUC. & STATS., 
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learning increases access to education for individuals who may not 
otherwise be able to obtain it, such as those with families or 
disabilities, or who live in remote areas.4 
Despite its advantages, regulation of distance learning has 
proven problematic. Degree-granting programs offered by for-
profit distance learning institutions are particularly troublesome 
due to the lack of regulatory experience in dealing with these 
programs.  Furthermore, recent investigations and student 
complaints have revealed that for-profit universities have at times 
taken advantage of ill-informed or vulnerable populations. 
For-profit institutions account for over nine percent of the 
national population of students enrolled at higher education 
institutions.5 The rapid growth of for-profit universities has been 
met with numerous reports of improper practices.  These reports 
have resulted in increased scrutiny from the media and both the 
federal and state governments. A 2010 PBS Frontline special shed 
light on questionable recruitment tactics, high student loan debt 
burdens, and poor overall educational outcomes associated with 
these institutions.6 In 2010, Iowa Senator Tom Harkin led a series 
of Congressional hearings that focused on for-profit universities’ 
alleged improprieties, which included allegations that they made 
misleading claims regarding program credentials and used 
deceptive and fraudulent sales tactics.7 The Government 
Accountability Office (“GAO”) conducted undercover testing of 
fifteen for-profit colleges and found that all fifteen made 
“deceptive or otherwise questionable” statements to undercover 
                                                            
http://nces.ed.gov/fastfacts/display.asp?id=80 (last visited Feb. 7, 2015). 
4 CAL. DISTANCE LEARNING PROJECT, What is Distance Learning?, supra 
note 1. 
5 For-profit Colleges and Universities, NAT’L CONF. OF STATE. LEGS., 
(July 3, 2013), http://www.ncsl.org/research/education/for-profit-colleges-and-
universities.aspx. 
6 PBS Frontline: College, Inc. (PBS television broadcast May 4, 2010), 
available at http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/collegeinc/view/.  
7 Thomas L. Harnisch, Am. Ass’n of State Colls. & Univs., Changing 
Dynamics in State Oversight of For-Profit Colleges, POL’Y MATTERS, April 
2012, at 1, 3, available at http://www.aascu.org/uploadedFiles/AASCU/Content/ 
Root/PolicyAndAdvocacy/PolicyPublications/Policy_Matters/Changing%20Dy
namics%20in%20State%20Oversight%20of%20For-Profit%20Colleges.pdf.  
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applicants, and that four of them engaged in fraudulent practices.8 
Moreover, in August 2011, the U.S. Department of Justice filed a 
lawsuit against the Education Management Corporation, an 
operator of private for-profit postsecondary educational 
institutions. The primary charge against the company was that it 
paid recruiters based solely on the number of students enrolled—a 
violation of a federal law that prohibits colleges from providing 
any commission or incentive based either directly or indirectly on 
securing enrollment of students.9  
The Department of Education responded to increasing concern 
that the industry needed more oversight when it published the 2010 
Program Integrity Rules. One of these rules (the “Online State 
Authorization Rule”) requires higher education institutions 
offering distance-learning courses to obtain authorization from 
each state in which it does business if that state requires its own 
form of authorization.10 Thus, the Online State Authorization Rule 
would require programs to obtain approval in each state in which 
they operate, otherwise the program would risk losing federal 
funds under Title IV.11 While the Department of Education does 
not currently enforce the Online State Authorization Rule, it is 
widely believed that this rule will be reintroduced in 2015.  
However, the debate surrounding the Online State 
Authorization Rule brought to light the complexity of the state 
                                                            
8 U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-10-984T, FOR-PROFIT 
COLLEGES: UNDERCOVER TESTING FINDS COLLEGES ENCOURAGED FRAUD AND 
ENGAGED IN DECEPTIVE AND QUESTIONABLE MARKETING PRACTICES (2010) 
[hereinafter GAO, UNDERCOVER TESTING], available at http://www.gao.gov/ 
products/GAO-10-948T. 
9 Stephen Burd, A Non-Profit College Recruiting Scandal?, HIGHER ED 
WATCH (June 14, 2011), http://higheredwatch.newamerica.net/node/53064; 
Charles Huckabee, Whistle-Blower Suit Against Education Management Corp. 
to Proceed, CHRON. OF HIGHER EDUC. (May 7, 2014), http://chronicle.com/ 
blogs/ticker/whistle-blower-suit-against-education-management-corp-can-
proceed-judge-says/77179.   
10 State Authorization, 34 C.F.R. § 600.9 (2013); see also State 
Authorization, 75 Fed. Reg. 66,858–68 (Oct. 29, 2010) (providing legislative 
history for 34 C.F.R. § 600.9). 
11 Allie Bidwell, Many Colleges Could Lose Federal Aid Eligibility Under 
New Interpretation of Rule, CHRON. OF HIGHER EDUC. (April 3, 2013), 
http://chronicle.com/article/Many-Colleges-Could-Lose/138263/.  
546 JOURNAL OF LAW AND POLICY 
authorization regulatory scheme both for institutions seeking state 
authorization and the students enrolled at these institutions.12 As a 
result, the Commission on the Regulation of Postsecondary 
Distance Education (“Commission”) is working toward creating a 
set of regional interstate compacts that will remove some of the 
regulatory hurdles facing higher education institutions that attempt 
to procure authorization in more than one state.13 However, the 
regional interstate compacts focus primarily on easing the burden 
on higher education institutions that offer distance education, 
rather than ensuring that student consumers are protected.14 
Moreover, according to Marshal Hill, former Executive Director of 
the Nebraska Coordinating Committee for Postsecondary 
Education, states with subpar consumer protection frameworks will 
be excluded from the compacts entirely.15 Thus, the interstate 
compacts do not provide for or improve the consumer protection 
available to the students located in these excluded states.  
This Article proposes a new federal regulation that would tie 
Title IV federal funding of for-profit distance learning institutions 
to the consumer protection standards of the state in which the 
institution is headquartered. The proposed regulation would thus 
allow federal funds only for distance learning institutions 
                                                            
12 COMM’N ON THE REG. OF POSTSECONDARY DISTANCE EDUC., 
ADVANCING ACCESS THROUGH REGULATORY REFORM: FINDINGS, PRINCIPLES, 
AND RECOMMENDATIONS FOR THE STATE AUTHORIZATION RECIPROCITY 
AGREEMENT (SARA) 7 (2013) [hereinafter ADVANCING ACCESS].   
13 Id. at 3. The Commission is composed of former U.S. Secretary of 
Education Richard Riley and twenty other higher education leaders invited by 
the Association of Public and Land-Grant Universities and the State Higher 
Education Executive Officers to “explore the regulation of postsecondary 
distance education.”  The Commission was convened in May 2012 to “develop 
and provide recommendations that will address the costs and inefficiencies faced 
by postsecondary institutions that must comply with multiple (often 
inconsistent) state laws and regulations as they endeavor to provide educational 
opportunities to students in multiple state jurisdictions.” Id.  
14 Id. at 6 (“Complexity, confusion, and costs of compliance can be reduced 
if state laws and regulations embody common principles and/or rules are 
established that narrow compliance obligations [for institutions] . . . .”).  
15 Interview with Marshall Hill, Executive Director, Neb. Coordinating 
Comm. for Postsecondary Educ. (Apr. 17, 2012) [hereinafter Hill Interview]. 
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headquartered in states with adequate consumer protection 
frameworks.  
Part I provides an overview of the distance learning industry, 
with a particular focus on for-profit universities. It explores the 
risks that accompany for-profit universities, including the risks that 
these institutions in particular pose to their students and the 
accompanying financial liabilities that accrue to taxpayers and the 
federal government. In addition, this Part outlines the history of the 
regulation of education in the United States, focusing on the 
regulatory triad: private, nongovernmental accrediting bodies; the 
federal government; and the states.  
Part II introduces the federal government’s Online State 
Authorization Rule, its current status, and the varying state 
authorization schemes for higher education institutions that offer 
distance learning courses. It then discusses the problems created by 
the complexities of the state authorization regulatory structure.  
Part III presents a case study of California’s regulatory 
structure and assesses the deficiencies of the structure and how 
those deficiencies negatively affect student consumer protection in 
the state. It then describes the regulatory structure in Ohio, a state 
with a robust authorization process for higher education 
institutions. Part III then compares the state authorization 
regulatory frameworks in California and Ohio.  
Finally, Part IV introduces a regional interstate compact system 
and analyzes the deficiencies of this system. It then proposes a 
solution that involves tying federal funding of for-profit distance 
education providers to state consumer protection frameworks, a 
proposal that may help close current gaps in consumer protection.  
  
I.   AN OVERVIEW OF THE DISTANCE LEARNING INDUSTRY 
 
This Part introduces the concept of distance learning, including 
its benefits and its growth in the United States. Next, it covers for-
profit universities, including the problematic practices of these 
universities and how these practices hurt students. Finally, this Part 
explores the “regulatory triad”: the three regulatory authorities that 
oversee the education sector: private, nongovernmental accrediting 
bodies; the federal government; and states.  
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A. Distance Learning: Benefits and Statistics 
 
Distance learning greatly increases the availability and 
accessibility of education. It allows for both synchronous learning 
(when students and classroom instructors interact simultaneously) 
and asynchronous learning (when students choose when to access 
lessons and course materials, and communicate with their 
instructors).16 For students with families, disabilities, or limited 
transportation options, distance learning can reduce these barriers 
and make degree attainment possible.17 For schools, distance 
learning can lower costs and provide opportunities for 
collaboration across school systems.18 For example, while distance 
learning among the three public higher education segments in 
California (California Community Colleges, California State 
Universities, and the University of California) is currently 
fragmented, analysis suggests that these segments could 
collaborate to produce significant savings through shared online 
courses, joint academic collaboration, and public-private 
partnerships.19  
Distance education has grown rapidly: “In 2007–08, about 4.3 
million undergraduate students, or 20 percent of all 
undergraduates, took at least one distance education course. About 
0.8 million, or 4 percent of all undergraduates, took their entire 
program through distance education.”20 In 2012, about 18.2 
million, or about 11 percent of all undergraduates, took their entire 
program through distance education.21 Distance education has 
helped fuel the growth of the for-profit industry—“nearly ninety 
percent of the for-profit industry’s growth from 2000-2009 can be 
                                                            
16 MAC TAYLOR, CAL. LEGIS. ANALYST’S OFFICE, THE MASTER PLAN AT 
50: USING DISTANCE EDUCATION TO INCREASE COLLEGE ACCESS AND 
EFFICIENCY 6 (2010). This report was presented to the 197th Session of the 
California legislature at the California Student Aid Commission Public Hearing 
on February 23–24, 2012. Id. 
17 Id. 
18 See id.  
19 Id.  
20 NAT’L. CTR. FOR EDUC. & STATS., supra note 3.  
21 Enrollment in Distance Education Courses, by State: Fall 2012, NAT’L 
CTR. FOR EDUC. STATS. (June 2014), http://nces.ed.gov/pubs2014/2014023.pdf. 
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attributed to for-profit chains and primarily online 
establishments.”22  
 
B. For-Profit Universities: Problematic Practices 
 
For-profit educational institutions—also referred to as for-
profit colleges, proprietary institutions, trade schools, or private 
career schools—are postsecondary higher education institutions 
that “provid[e] job-focused education and skills while deriving a 
profit.”23 In comparison, nonprofit colleges and universities 
reinvest tuition money into the university, and thus individual 
stakeholders in the university do not stand to benefit financially 
from increased student enrollment.24 For-profit universities in the 
United States enroll approximately thirteen percent of the national 
population of students at higher education institutions.25 As a result 
of the for-profit industry’s growth—and the concomitant 
allegations of improper practices—for-profits have been the focus 
of increased scrutiny from federal and state governments and the 
media. Further, “for-profits educate a disproportionate share of 
minority, disadvantaged, and older students,” which raises 
                                                            
22 Harnisch, supra note 7, at 2.  
23 Cheryl Auster, Promising a Better Future but Delivering Debt: 
Understanding the Financial and Social Impact of For-Profit Colleges and the 
Effect of the New Program Integrity Rules, 13 SCHOLAR 631, 637 (2011).  
24  
Notwithstanding the historical or present rationales for 
nonprofit status, there is the strong tendency to associate 
nonprofits with a sense of altruism that is absent from for-
profit firms. Nonprofit higher educational institutions, unlike 
FPCUs [for-profit colleges and universities], receive 
significant donations from third parties. To an extent, 
nonprofit status may serve as a crude heuristic for quality in 
the higher education context. One can argue that nonprofit 
organization limits managerial incentives to exploit students 
and makes managers less sensitive to profit maximization.  
Omari Scott Simmons, For-Profits and the Market Paradox, 48 WAKE FOREST 
L. REV. 333, 348–49 (2013) (internal citations omitted). 
25 Obama Administration Takes Action to Protect Americans from 
Predatory, Poor-Performing Career Colleges, U.S. DEP’T OF EDUC. (Mar. 14, 
2014), http://www.ed.gov/news/press-releases/obama-administration-takes-
action-protect-americans-predatory-poor-performing-ca. 
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concerns about exploitation of society’s more vulnerable 
populations.26  
These students often lack both information crucial to making 
informed decisions about college and the “familial and 
extrafamilial networks, through which they can gather important 
information concerning higher education.”27 Research indicates 
that these students approach college decisions in a more ad hoc 
manner than students from privileged backgrounds, often failing to 
gather sufficient information about educational quality when 
making important decisions such as school selection.28  Moreover, 
if these students attend public schools, they are also likely to lack 
access to individualized counseling about their higher education 
options.29 Thus, these students are more likely to both misinterpret 
information about, and be misled by, for-profit higher education 
institutions.30 
Moreover, the profit-driven mission of these institutions 
increases their incentive to enroll more students.31 This incentive 
can result in deceptive marketing and recruitment practices that 
                                                            
26 Kelly Field, Study Finds Mixed Results for Students Attending For-Profit 
Schools, CHRON. OF HIGHER EDUC. (Jan. 3, 2012), http://chronicle.com/ 
blogs/ticker/study-finds-mixed-results-for-students-attending-for-profit-
colleges/39474. “Affluent students cluster at four-year public and private 
universities, whereas working class, low-income, veterans, and underrepresented 
minority students cluster at two-year community colleges and FPCUs [for-profit 
colleges and universities].” Omari Scott Simmons, For-Profits and the Market 
Paradox, 48 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 333, 359 (2013). 
27 Simmons, supra note 26, at 351–52. 
28 Id.  
29 Id. at 352. 
30 Id. This information asymmetry is further enhanced by the easy entry 
into for-profit higher education institutions. Id. at 337 (“But the portable and 
loan-heavy nature of federal financial aid also has a downside: ill-informed, 
vulnerable students may be duped into selecting inferior educational options that 
differentially empower them.”). 
31 Id. at 352–53 (“At traditional institutions, tuition rarely exceeds total 
education costs due to institutional subsidies. FPCUs [for-profit colleges and 
universities], however, do not subsidize a meaningful portion of total 
educational costs. Instead, FPCUs charge tuition that normally exceeds total 
education costs. Within this context, hard-selling techniques used by FPCUs are 
not surprising; they are expected.”).  
PROTECTING STUDENTS, PROTECTING CONSUMERS  551 
ignore students’ best interests.32 In 2010, undercover testing by the 
GAO found that for-profit universities engaged in fraudulent 
practices.33 GAO agents posed undercover as prospective students 
and applied for admission to fifteen for-profit colleges located in 
six states and Washington, D.C.34 The testing found that some for-
profit college representatives exaggerated potential future earnings, 
failed to provide clear information about program costs and 
graduation rates, and pressured applicants to sign contracts for 
enrollment without providing them with a financial advisor to 
counsel them on program costs and financing options.35  
Students at for-profit universities also tend to borrow more 
heavily to finance their education than students enrolled at other 
types of universities. A recent study indicated “that 94% of 
students who enroll at for-profit colleges take out federal loans to 
pay for tuition, compared [to] 33% of students at public nonprofit 
colleges[,] and 69% of students at private nonprofit universities.”36 
In addition, a Department of Education study determined that 
although for-profit universities enrolled only about thirteen percent 
of the nation’s undergraduates in 2010, their students comprised 
close to half of all federal student loan defaults in fiscal year 2012 
for loans that went into repayment in fiscal year 2010.37  
Large amounts of student debt affect the student and the public 
in several ways: “(1) the financial burden on the individual 
                                                            
32 See GAO, UNDERCOVER TESTING, supra note 8, at 7–13. 
33 Id. Revisions were made to this report in November 2010. For an article 
critical of this report and its revisions see Nick Anderson, GAO Revises Its 
Report Critical of Practices at For-Profit Schools, WASH. POST (Dec. 7, 2010, 
8:44 PM), http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2010/12/07/ 
AR2010120706803.html. 
34 GAO, UNDERCOVER TESTING, supra note 8, at 2. 
35 Id. at 9–11.  
36 Nicholas R. Johnson, Phoenix Rising: Default Rates at Proprietary 
Institutions of Higher Education and What Can Be Done to Reduce Them, 40 
J.L. & EDUC. 225, 232 (2011).  
37 Tbl.331.20 Enrollment in degree–granting postsecondary institutions: 
2000–2012, NAT’L CTR. FOR EDUC. STAT. (November 2013), http://nces.ed.gov/ 
programs/digest/d13/tables/dt13_331.20.asp; Tbl. 332.5: Postsecondary student 
loan repayment and default statistics, by default period and level and control of 
institution: 2009–2011, NAT’L CTR. FOR EDUC. STATS. (December 2013), 
http://nces.ed.gov/programs/digest/d13/tables/dt13_332.50.asp. 
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[student]; (2) the expense of loan subsidies to taxpayers; and (3) 
the negative effect of defaults on the individual and the 
taxpayer.”38 If a student is unable to pay back a loan due to 
economic hardship, the student may request forbearance of the 
loan, which “results in the government waiving interest 
payments.”39 While forbearance represents a gain for the 
individual debt-holder, taxpayers ultimately must pay the costs.40 
When students default on loans, the federal government and 
taxpayers “assume nearly all the risk[s] and are left with the 
costs.”41 
However, this is not to understate the impact that defaulting on 
student loans has on the students themselves. Students who default 
on loans suffer a variety of negative consequences, including poor 
credit ratings, possible prohibition from obtaining a professional 
license,42 wage garnishment, the inability to qualify for future 
student loans, and collection harassment.43 Further, student loan 
debt is more difficult to discharge than most other types of debt.44 
In a typical Chapter 7 bankruptcy proceeding, “a court sells the 
debtor’s assets and the creditors receive the proceeds from the sale 
of the assets.”45 The court then discharges the remainder of the 
debtor’s obligations to creditors, including, for example, credit 
card debt or debt related to medical bills.46 In contrast, with student 
loan debt, a student must generally convince a bankruptcy judge 
                                                            
38 Auster, supra note 23, at 667–68. 
39 Id. at 668.  
40 Id.  
41 GAO, UNDERCOVER TESTING, supra note 8, at 5. 
42 See, e.g., TENN. CODE ANN. §63-1-141 (West 2010). 
43 Id.  
44 Michael Simkovic, Risk-Based Student Loans, 70 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 
527, 611 (2013) (“Whereas the U.S. Bankruptcy Code generally gives individual 
borrowers an ‘insurance policy’ against failure in the form of a bankruptcy 
discharge, student loans are somewhat more difficult to discharge than most 
kinds of debt.”).  
45 Amy E. Sparrow, Unduly Harsh: The Need to Examine Educational 
Value in Student Loan Discharge  
Cases Involving For-Profit Schools, 80 TEMP. L. REV. 329, 342 (2007). 
46 Id.  
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that he or she suffered an “undue hardship,” a standard which is 
difficult to meet.47  
 
C. The Regulatory Triad and Consumer Protection 
 
The regulatory bodies of the higher education sector are often 
referred to as the “regulatory triad”—private, nongovernmental 
accrediting bodies, the federal government, and states.48 While 
regulation of the higher education sector is considered a shared 
responsibility of the regulatory triad, the limited regulatory power 
of the federal government and accrediting agencies over higher 
education institutions means that states are in the best oversight 
position.49 However, states vary considerably in their consumer 
protection activities and enforcement.50 Typically, state consumer 
protection in the realm of higher education includes regulations on 
advertising, educational outcomes, personnel credentials, and 
consumer complaints.51 Generally, either the state’s higher 
education commission or consumer protection agency oversees this 
regulatory activity.52 
                                                            
47 See id. at 331–32. To determine what constitutes an “undue hardship,” a 
majority of circuits have adopted the three part test articulated in Brunner v. N.Y. 
State Higher Educ. Serv. Corp., 831 F.2d 395, 396 (2d Cir. 1987). The three part 
Brunner test requires a debtor to show:  
(1) that the debtor cannot maintain, based on current income 
and expenses, a ‘minimal’ standard of living for herself and 
her dependents if forced to repay the loans;  
(2) that additional circumstances exist indicating that this state 
of affairs is likely to persist for a significant portion of the 
repayment period of the student loans; and  
(3) that the debtor had made good faith efforts to repay the 
loans.   
Brunner, 831 F.2d at 396; see also, Daniel A. Austin, The Indentured 
Generation: Bankruptcy and Student Loan Debt, 53 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 329, 
373–81 (2013) (providing an in depth analysis of each of the three prongs of the 
Brunner test and what a debtor needs to prove to satisfy them). 
48 Harnisch, supra note 7, at 1. 
49 See id. at 8. 
50 Id. at 9. 
51 Id. 
52 See id.  
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1. Accrediting Agencies 
 
Accrediting agencies are private, nongovernmental entities 
designed to ensure that higher education institutions meet a certain 
level of quality. These private educational associations, either 
regional or national in scope, “develop criteria and conduct peer 
evaluations to assess whether or not those criteria are met.”53 
National agencies focus on accrediting for-profit schools, whereas 
regional agencies focus on accrediting public and nonprofit 
universities.54 If an institution or program meets an accrediting 
agency’s criteria, it becomes “accredited.” 
 The Department of Education requires that institutions be 
accredited in order to receive Title IV funds.55 Accrediting 
agencies thus have the power to provide or deny access to billions 
of dollars of federal education benefits each year.56 Critics of 
accreditation assert that the process is not sufficiently rigorous to 
safeguard this substantial amount of money.57 Further, institutions 
often use their accreditation status as a means of promoting 
legitimacy, which can be problematic because approval by an 
accrediting agency does not necessarily ensure the quality of a 
school.58  
                                                            
53 Accrediting Agencies, CAL. POSTSECONDARY EDUC. COMM’N (March 28, 
2012, 6:05 PM), http://www.cpec.ca.gov/x_collegeguide_old/ 
accreditingagencies.asp.  
54 See STAFF OF S. COMM. ON HEALTH, EDUC., LABOR & PENSIONS, 112TH 
CONG., S. PRT. NO. 112–37: FOR PROFIT HIGHER EDUCATION: THE FAILURE TO 
SAFEGUARD THE FEDERAL INVESTMENT AND ENSURE STUDENT SUCCESS 141 
(Comm. Print 2012), available at http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/CPRT-
112SPRT74931/pdf/CPRT-112SPRT74931.pdf. [hereinafter FOR PROFIT 
HIGHER EDUCATION]. 
55 See 20 U.S.C. §§ 1099b, 1099c-1 (2014). 
56 FOR PROFIT HIGHER EDUCATION, supra note 54, at 145–46.  
57 Eric Kelderman, In Accreditation Proposals, Panel Pleases Neither 
Reformers nor Status Quo Advocates, CHRON. HIGHER EDUC. (April 13, 2012), 
http://chronicle.com/article/In-Accreditation-Proposals/131561/. These 
criticisms came from panelists on the National Advisory Committee on 
Institutional Quality and Integrity, “an 18-member panel that advises the 
education secretary on whether to approve accrediting agencies as gatekeepers 
of federal financial aid.” Id.  
58 See id. (“Accreditation currently gives students and parents a false sense 
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Accrediting agencies are under increasing scrutiny, in part 
because of the view that they have not adequately dealt with 
recruiting and enrollment fraud.59 This may be the result of the fast 
growth of the for-profit education sector, which has “outpaced 
accrediting agencies’ efforts to measure and enforce basic 
standards of quality in higher education.”60 In the past, accrediting 
agencies oversaw institutions whose primary focus was academic 
improvement.61 Now, the education sector, and specifically the for-
profit education sector, is also driven by profit maximization and 
growth.62 As a result, accreditors are “behind the curve” and do not 
have in place the policy framework and procedures necessary to 
adequately deal with the changing landscape of the higher 
education sector.63 
Moreover, policy makers and the public have high expectations 
for accreditation. Accreditation is expected to serve as a barrier 
against abuse and fraud, a means of measuring academic 
performance, a tool for parents and students to compare the value 
                                                            
that accredited schools have passed a meaningful test of quality when they have 
not.”). See also FOR PROFIT HIGHER EDUCATION, supra note 54, at 142 (“The 
self-reporting and peer-review nature of the accreditation process exposes it to 
manipulation . . . .”); Judith S. Eaton, U.S. Accreditation: Meeting the 
Challenges of Accountability and Student Achievement, 5 EVALUATION IN 
HIGHER ED. 1, 12 (June 2011) (noting that accreditors “view accountability as 
primarily a ‘formative’ process,” which means that “when accreditors review 
institutions and programs and find flaws in [their] operations, [the accreditors] 
call for remediation of deficiencies even as they . . . continue accreditation.”). 
59 See FOR PROFIT HIGHER EDUCATION, supra note 54, at 145–46 (noting 
that ACICS, one of two major national accrediting agencies, “recently 
announced that it had revised its placement data for each of its 49 campuses 
under scrutiny by the New York State attorney general . . . [with the revisions 
showing] that only 13 of the 49 campuses met the accreditor’s placement-rate 
standards.”).  See generally Sam Dillon, Troubles Grow for a University Built 
on Profits, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 11, 2007), available at http://www.nytimes.com/ 
2007/02/11/education/11phoenix.html?pagewanted=all&_r=0 (discussing 
University of Phoenix’s legal troubles resulting from inadequate enrollment and 
credit hour standards, fraudulent graduation rate reporting and other substantial 
improprieties related to student recruitment and enrollment). 
60 FOR PROFIT HIGHER EDUCATION, supra note 54, at 144. 
61 Id. at 144–45.  
62 Id. at 144.  
63 Id. at 144–46. 
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of different colleges, and “as a stamp of financial stability.”64 
However, accrediting agencies often do not have the staff or legal 
authority to conduct investigations into consumer complaints.65 
Accrediting agencies typically have only one powerful tool against 
noncompliant higher education institutions—disaccreditation.66 
The lack of graduated disciplinary methods thus inhibits the 
effectiveness of accrediting agencies.67 
 
2. The Federal Government 
 
Within the regulatory triad, the federal government oversees 
the administration of federal student aid funds and evaluates 
institutional eligibility to participate in federal student aid 
programs.68 Before 1972, only nonprofit and public institutions 
were eligible for Title IV funding.69 Beginning in 1972, Congress 
authorized for-profit institutions to receive federal student loans 
and grants through the Department of Education.70 In making this 
change, Congress recognized that for-profit institutions had “done 
                                                            
64 Eric Kelderman, Accreditors Examine Their Flaws as Calls for Change 
Intensify, CHRON. HIGHER EDUC. (Nov. 3, 2011), http://chronicle.com/ 
article/Accreditors-Examine-Their/129765/. 
65 Id. 
66 Harnisch, supra note 7, at 8. 
67 Kevin Carey, A Tale of ‘Too Big to Fail’ in Higher Education, N.Y. 
TIMES, July 15, 2014, http://www.nytimes.com/2014/07/15/upshot/city-college-
of-san-francisco-survives.html?_r=0.  “The accreditor, an independent, nonprofit 
body that determines whether colleges can receive federal financial aid, is the 
only outside organization with substantial regulatory authority over schools like 
City College. But like an army with no weapons other than thermonuclear 
bombs, its power is too potent and blunt to use.” Id. Carey also explains why 
accreditation agencies are often unwilling to take the final step of 
disaccreditation. Id. The reasons he provides range from political pressure to the 
unwillingness of college administrators to “condemn peers at other institutions 
publicly, particularly since their turn for review will eventually come.” Id.  
68 Accreditation in the United States, U.S. DEP’T OF EDUC., 
http://www2.ed.gov/admins/finaid/accred/accreditation_pg3.html#Recognition 
(last visited Feb. 7, 2015). 
69 Simmons, supra note 24, at 339. 
70 FOR PROFIT HIGHER EDUCATION, supra note 54, at 153. 
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well the socially valuable job of training people for technical and 
semi-professional careers.”71  
As a result, for-profit universities’ existence is premised on the 
availability of these substantial federal funds. However, in the 
Higher Education Amendments of 1992, Congress limited the 
proportion of Department of Education funds available to for-profit 
colleges to a percentage of their total revenue.72  After these 
amendments, for-profit colleges were limited to receiving federal 
student aid funds equal to 85 percent of their revenue.73 The 
proportion has now increased to 90 percent, commonly referred to 
as the “90/10 rule.”74 These rules were designed to ensure that 
students, employers, and state agencies contribute to a student’s 
education, and thus have a stake in the success of a student’s 
educational outcome.75 Failure to abide by the 90/10 rule results in 
penalties for the school, including federal financial aid 
ineligibility.76  
Despite these measures that were designed to safeguard 
students and prevent abuse of the federal financial aid system, the 
federal government does not have a comprehensive consumer 
protection scheme for students. Similar to the limited consumer 
protection role of accreditation agencies, the federal government 
has only a limited ability to help aggrieved students. Students with 
complaints specifically related to student loans can file a complaint 
with the Federal Student Aid Ombudsman Office, which will work 
with students, officers of the U.S. Department of Education, 
private lenders, loan guaranty agencies and servicing agencies in 
order to resolve disputes related only to student loans.77 However, 
                                                            
71 Johnson, supra note 36, at 240 (quoting H.R. REP. NO. 92-554, pt. 1 at 
2484 (1972)). 
72 FOR PROFIT HIGHER EDUCATION, supra note 54, at 154. 
73 Id. 
74 Id. at 156.  
75 Id. at 154–55.  
76 Id. at 156. “Colleges that fail to comply with the rule for two consecutive 
years lose their eligibility to participate in the student-aid programs for at least 
two years.” Alina Mogilyanskaya, 3 For-Profits Lose Student-Aid Eligibility 
After Failing 90/10 Test Twice, CHRON. HIGHER EDUC. A22 (Oct. 5, 2012), 
available at http://chronicle.com/article/3-Institutions-Lose/134696/. 
77 Getting Prepared Before Seeking Help, FED. STUDENT AID, 
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the Federal Student Aid Ombudsman Office does not handle 
complaints about such issues as the quality of educational 
programming, recruiting practices, or issues with credits received 
for courses, among other things. 
 
3. States 
 
States typically provide higher education institutions with the 
legal authority to operate, and students with consumer protections. 
They may also regulate standards for participation in state student 
financial aid programs.78 States approaches education oversight 
differently. The result is that some states have robust regulatory 
schemes, while others have far laxer systems. These varying state 
regulatory schemes lead to complexities for higher education 
institutions and students, as discussed in Part II. 
 
II.  FEDERAL AND STATE OVERSIGHT OF POSTSECONDARY 
DISTANCE LEARNING: A FRAGMENTED APPROACH TO 
REGULATION 
 
Typically, the regulation of education is the province of state 
governments.79 However, a 2010 federal regulation introduced 
federal oversight into the distance learning industry.80 This Part 
introduces the 2010 federal regulation, which required that 
distance learning providers be authorized in each state in which 
they offer courses.81 Next, this Part outlines state authorization 
requirements for distance learning providers and provides an 
                                                            
https://studentaid.ed.gov/repay-loans/disputes/prepare (last visited Feb. 7, 2015). 
See also About the FSA Ombudsman, FED. STUDENT AID (Mar. 28, 2012, 7:35 
PM), https://ombudsman.ed.gov/about/about.html#whereelsetogo (providing the 
complaint form for students with grievances). 
78 Harnisch, supra note 7, at 8. 
79 See, e.g., Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 213 (1972) (“There is no 
doubt as to the power of a State, having a high responsibility for education of its 
citizens, to impose reasonable regulations for the control and duration of basic 
education.”). 
80 34 C.F.R. § 600.9 (2010). The D.C. Circuit overruled portions of the 
Program Integrity Rules in Ass'n of Private Sector Colls. & Univs. v. Duncan, 
681 F.3d 427, 461–463 (D.C. Cir. 2012). 
81 34 C.F.R. § 600.9(c) (2010). 
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overview of the three main criteria states use to determine whether 
a distance learning provider must become authorized in that state. 
Finally, this Part introduces the complexities created by the 2010 
federal regulations and the varying requirements for state 
authorization.  
 
A. Federal Oversight 
 
In October 2010, the U.S. Department of Education released an 
amendment explaining the Online State Authorization Rule of the 
Program Integrity Rules, a component of the Higher Education 
Act.82 The Online State Authorization Rule requires institutions 
offering online programs to obtain approval in each state in which 
they operate, or else risk losing Title IV federal funding.83 Whether 
an institution may offer distance or correspondence education in a 
particular state is a matter of widely varying state laws. In essence, 
for those institutions dependent on Title IV funding, this new rule 
results in federal oversight of state higher education licensing for 
institutions.84 Due to a procedural violation, the Department of 
Education does not currently enforce the Online State 
                                                            
82 Id. § 600.9. 
83 Id. § 600.9. Title IV funding is the federal financial aid programs 
authorized under Title IV of the Higher Education Act, and is regulated and 
administered by the U.S. Department of Education. REBECCA R. SKINNER, 
CONG. RESEARCH SERV., INSTITUTIONAL ELIGIBILITY FOR PARTICIPATION IN 
TITLE IV STUDENT AID PROGRAMS UNDER THE HIGHER EDUCATION ACT: 
BACKGROUND AND REAUTHORIZATION ISSUES, RL33909 (2007), available at 
http://assets.opencrs.com/rpts/RL33909_20070309.pdf.  
84   
To give states and distance-education programs “some 
breathing room,” the Department will give colleges until July 
1, 2014, to obtain all necessary state approvals, so long as they 
are making a “good faith effort” to do so before then, an 
administration official told reporters on Wednesday. Evidence 
of such an effort could include an application to a state or 
documentation from a state that an application is pending, 
among other actions.  
Kelly Field, Colleges Get More Time to Comply with New Rule on State 
Authorization, CHRON. HIGHER EDUC. (Apr. 20, 2011), 
http://chronicle.com/article/Colleges-Get-More-Time-to/127216/. 
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Authorization Rule, but it has indicated that it will reintroduce the 
rule in 2015.85  
 
B. State Oversight  
 
State regulations are generally place-based; thus, distance 
learning by its very nature presents challenges for state governance 
because it crosses state lines. States may be reluctant to regulate 
universities based in other states, or may not have data regarding 
the enrollment of their residents in out-of-state distance learning 
programs.  
State authorization requirements for higher education 
institutions also vary greatly. The Online State Authorization Rule 
has brought into sharp focus this wide variation in state 
authorization requirements.86 For example, states vary as to 
whether a higher education institution is required to be authorized 
in a state in order to offer distance learning courses to that state’s 
residents, and the process through which higher education 
institutions become authorized varies by state.  
There are, however, several trends in how states determine 
whether an institution requires authorization in order to operate 
within the state. States tend to use one of three common models to 
                                                            
85 In 2012, the District of Columbia Circuit held that the Online State 
Authorization Rule violated the Administrative Procedure Act because it failed 
to provide adequate notice of the rule to regulated parties. See Ass'n of Private 
Sector Colls. & Univs. v. Duncan, 681 F.3d at 461–63. However, the 
Department of Education has indicated that it will reintroduce the Online State 
Authorization Rule, as evidenced by the Online State Authorization Rule’s 
inclusion in the Department of Education’s Program Integrity and Improvement 
Negotiated Rulemaking.  Negotiated Rulemaking 2013-2014: Program Integrity 
and Improvement, U.S. DEP’T OF EDUC., https://www2.ed.gov/policy/ 
highered/reg/hearulemaking/2012/programintegrity.html (last visited Feb. 16, 
2015). It is widely believed by those involved in the higher education industry 
and in the Negotiated Rulemaking that the reintroduction of this legislation will 
occur sometime in 2015. Email interview with Alan Contreras, State 
Authorization Reciprocity Agreement Coordinator, National Council/WICHE 
(Oct. 27, 2014) (on file with author). 
86 See generally EDUVENTURES, ONLINE LEARNING ACROSS STATE 
BORDERS: ASSESSING STATE REGULATION OF OUT-OF-STATE SCHOOLS 11 
(2011) (providing an overview of the state regulation of out-of-state schools 
with regard to online learning, recruitment, and institution licensing volume).  
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regulate distance learning: (1) the physical presence model; (2) the 
online explicit model; and (3) the exemption model.87 Each of 
these models is discussed in turn below. The wide variation among 
models provides a window into the complex regulatory regime and 
the need for standardization.  
 
1. The Physical Presence Model 
 
A majority of states will look to “physical presence” within the 
state, or whether a state is “operating” within the state, in order to 
determine whether to regulate a private postsecondary distance 
learning institution.88 The terms used to describe physical presence 
vary considerably among states. Some states, such as Kansas89 and 
Missouri, explicitly define the term. Missouri defines “operate” as 
“to establish, keep, or maintain any facility at a location or 
locations in this state where, from, or through which education is 
offered or given and shall include contracting with any person, 
group, or entity to perform any such act.”90 In contrast, South 
Dakota does not define physical presence; it merely notes that “no 
postsecondary institution may provide educational programs at 
                                                            
87 See id. at 11–14 (categorizing states into these three models, along with a 
fourth, “online ambiguous”). 
88 See id. at 10 (depicting a chart which indicates that in 2011, fifty-five 
percent of states utilize a physical presence model).  
89 For example, the Kansas Board of Regents requires a Certificate of 
Approval that must be renewed annually for “all schools operating with a 
physical presence in Kansas or that are actively soliciting enrollment of 
prospective students to receive instruction in the state of Kansas.” Private/Out-
of-State, KAN. BD. OF REGENTS, http://www.kansasregents.org/academic 
_affairs/private_out_of_state (last visited Feb. 16, 2015). The Kansas Board of 
Regents further defines active solicitation as  
trying to attract students to enroll in a course (who will remain 
in Kansas while taking the course) by doing things like 
placing ads in Kansas papers or running ads on Kansas based 
TV or Radio stations, student recruitment, or engaging in other 
means of solicitation that specifically contacts or targets 
Kansas residents in order to encourage them to enroll in a out-
of-state postsecondary school that is offering a certificate, 
diploma or degree. 
Id.  
90 MO. REV. STAT. § 173.600 (2013). 
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physical locations in South Dakota unless” the institution receives 
authorization.91  
Moreover, states differ in how they define the physical 
presence requirement. For example, the Kansas Board of Regents 
interprets statutorily-defined physical presence to include both a 
physical building and solicitation that contacts or targets Kansas 
residents.92 In contrast, the Nebraska physical presence 
requirement is defined as establishing an administrative office or 
mailing address in Nebraska, or offering within the state a course 
for college credit or a degree program.93 Institutions that market to 
Nebraska students, but do not meet the aforementioned criteria, do 
not require authorization to operate in Nebraska. Marshall Hill 
advocates Nebraska’s physical presence model and finds the more 
expansive physical presence model to be impractical and overly 
burdensome on states.94 
 
2. The Online Explicit Model 
 
Some states have explicit regulatory language that suggests 
jurisdiction, rather than online instruction, as the basis for 
regulation. For example, Arkansas’s application for postsecondary 
degree programs to offer courses in Arkansas notes that “any non-
public or out-of-state postsecondary education institution offering 
course/degree programs customarily offered at colleges and 
universities must obtain certification from the Arkansas Higher 
Education Coordinating Board before offering distance delivery 
college-level course/degree programs to Arkansas students.”95 
                                                            
91 State Authorization Regulations for Postsecondary Education, S.D. BD. 
OF REGENTS, http://www.sdbor.edu/mediapubs/StateApproval.htm (last visited 
Feb. 16, 2015). 
92 KAN. BD. OF REGENTS, supra note 89.   
93 This includes establishing a location for “synchronous or asynchronous 
instruction” or requiring students to “physically meet in one location for 
instructional purposes more than once during the course term.” 281 NEB. 
ADMIN. CODE, ch.7  § 003.05, available at http://www.ccpe.state.ne.us/ 
PublicDoc/Ccpe/Rules/pdf/chapter7.pdf. See also generally Legal and 
Regulatory, NEB. COORDINATING COMM’N FOR POSTSECONDARY EDUC. (Apr. 
17, 2012), http://www.ccpe.state.ne.us/PublicDoc/Ccpe/LegalRegs/default.asp.  
94 Hill Interview, supra note 15. 
95 ARK. DEP’T OF HIGHER EDUC., APPLICATION FOR THE CERTIFICATION OF 
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Similarly, under Alabama state law, the Alabama Commission on 
Higher Education has jurisdiction over “non-resident institutions 
defined as postsecondary institutions or corporations offering 
educational programs in Alabama with main campuses or 
headquarters located outside the state.”96 
 
3. The Exemption Model 
 
A minority of states, including California,97 use an exemption 
model that allows out-of-state institutions to rely on regional and 
sometimes national accreditation rather than the independent 
licensure of the state.98 Utah, for example, does not require out-of-
state schools “accredited by a regional or national accrediting 
agency recognized by the Department of Education” to seek 
registration in the state.99 Other states that follow a similar model 
include Alaska, Colorado, Delaware and Hawaii.100 
 
C. Problems and Complexities Created by the Federal 
Online State Authorization Rule 
 
The federal Online State Authorization Rule is problematic for 
both institutions and students. Procuring authorization to operate in 
multiple states can be prohibitively expensive and time-consuming 
for institutions enrolling distance learning students. Very few 
institutions other than large for-profits “ever considered that they 
might need each state’s approval in advance should someone from 
that state happen to join their online program,” and as a result, 
most were unprepared for the complex state authorization 
                                                            
COLLEGE-LEVEL COURSE/DEGREE PROGRAMS AT ESTABLISHED INSTITUTIONS 
(DISTANCE DELIVERY) 2 (2005), available at http://www.adhe.edu/ 
SiteCollectionDocuments/AcademicAffairsDivision/ICAC%20Rules%20and%2
0Regulations/rules_part1sec2_011609.pdf.  
96 Non-Resident Institutions, ALA. COMM’N ON HIGHER EDUC., 
http://www.ache.alabama.gov/Content/Departments/NRI/NRI.aspx (last visited 
Feb. 16, 2015). The Alabama code that the Commission on Higher Education 
bases its regulations on is ALA. CODE §16-5-10(14) (1975). 
97 See infra Part III.A. 
98 EDUVENTURES, supra note 86, at 11. 
99 Utah Postsecondary Proprietary School Act §13-34-105(1)(e) (2014). 
100 EDUVENTURES, supra note 86, at 11. 
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process.101 Institutions may need to deal with more than one 
authorizing body within a state to procure authorization to operate 
in that state.102 As a result, a joint survey by two education 
associations indicated that, in July 2011, “sixty-nine percent of 
institutions [had] yet to apply for approval in any state.”103 Some 
institutions indicated that they lacked the funds necessary to 
address state compliance.104 
Moreover, large for-profit institutions are more likely than 
other types of universities to have the staffing and financial 
resources necessary to navigate the complex state authorization 
web, while smaller or nonprofit institutions may not.105 In addition, 
many states had not considered out-of-state distance learning 
programs, and as result had neither the regulations in place nor the 
resources to accept and process an influx of applications.106 
Lastly, the requirement for state authorization can also harm 
students. A survey of institutions in early 2011 indicated that fifty-
nine percent of institutions anticipated not accepting students from 
certain states.107 If institutions decide not to seek state approval in 
certain states, students in those states will be unable to enroll in 
these institutions. This is especially problematic for those students 
who hope to enroll in distance education programs that serve niche 
markets, such as Bismarck North Dakota State College’s program 
for the energy industry or American Academy McCallister 
                                                            
101 Jay Halfond, Unintended Consequences: An Uncertain Future for 
Distance Learning, NEW ENG. J. HIGHER EDUC., June 9, 2011, 
http://www.nebhe.org/thejournal/unintended-consequences-an-uncertain-future-
for-distance-learning/.  
102 Hill Interview, supra note 15. 
103 What Are Institutions Doing (or NOT Doing) About State 
Authorization?, WCET ADVANCE (Aug. 18, 2011), http://wcet.wiche.edu/ 
advance/upcea-wcet-sa-survey. The survey was conducted by University 
Professional & Continuing Education Association (UPCEA) and WICHE 
Cooperative for Educational Technologies. Id.  
104 Id. 
105 In fact, many institutions not in compliance with the State Authorization 
Rule are established, not-for-profit institutions. See Harnisch supra note 7, at 9. 
106 Halfond, supra note 101.  
107 WCET ADVANCE, supra note 103.  
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Institute’s program for funeral study, since it may be difficult to 
find a comparable program elsewhere in the United States.108 
Perhaps even more problematically, the wide range of state 
regulatory models along with the complexity of state requirements 
create barriers for distance learning students who seek recourse for 
issues they encounter with higher education institutions. Students 
may have difficulty determining which state has authority over 
their complaint, or which state laws are applicable. Students may 
get “passed back and forth” between higher education regulatory 
agencies of different states.109 Furthermore, students with a 
complaint who are located in a state that exempts accredited higher 
education institutions from state education laws may have little or 
no recourse for any difficulties they encounter with a higher 
education institution which is also based in an exempt state.  
 
III. STATE REGULATORY MODELS COMPARED 
 
The wide variation in state regulatory models results in 
different regulatory schemes with which educational institutions 
must comply in order to become authorized to offer distance 
education in that state. Part III provides a comparison between two 
states with widely divergent processes for state authorization. This 
Part first outlines California’s notoriously lax oversight of higher 
education institutions. It next details Ohio’s authorization process. 
It concludes by comparing the two models. 
 
A. California—Lax Oversight 
 
The difficulties that higher education students face, as outlined 
in Part II.C, are especially pronounced in California. California’s 
exemption model results in lax oversight of higher education 
institutions in the state, creating a problematic regulatory structure 
that adversely affects both traditional classroom and distance 
learning students. 
                                                            
108 Russel Poulin & Jim Fong, Putting a Student Face on the State 
Authorization Regulation, CAMPUS TECHNOLOGY (Aug. 24, 2011), 
http://campustechnology.com/Articles/2011/08/24/Putting-a-Student-Face-on-
the-State-Authorization-Regulation.aspx?Page=1.  
109 Hill Interview, supra note 15. 
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Furthermore, the for-profit industry in California is particularly 
active, prompting even greater concern regarding the regulatory 
structure in the state. For-profit universities enroll more than a 
quarter of California’s undergraduate students.110 Students at 
California’s for-profit universities experience many of the same 
issues facing students enrolled at for-profit universities across the 
country, but often to a greater degree. For example, sixty-seven 
percent of the state’s student loan defaulters attended a for-profit 
university even though for-profit universities awarded only twenty 
percent of all degrees and certificates.111 In comparison, the 
national rate of student loan defaulters who attended for-profit 
universities is forty-seven percent.112  
 
1. The Bureau for Private Postsecondary 
Education   
 
Postsecondary education in California is governed by the 
California Private Postsecondary Education Act of 2009 (“the 
Act”), which established a Bureau for Private Postsecondary 
Education within the Department of Consumer Affairs (“the 
Bureau”).113 Currently, the Bureau oversees higher education 
                                                            
110 California Oversight of Private Postsecondary Education: Joint 
Oversight Hearing Before Assembly Higher Educ. Comm. and Senate Bus., 
Professions and Econ. Dev. Comm., 2012 Leg., 197th Sess. (Cal. 2012) 
[hereinafter Joint Hearing], available at http://www.ticas.org/files/pub/ 
Debbie_Cochrane_testimony_2-14-12.pdf. 
111 Liz Guillen, Fact Sheet: California’s Oversight of Private 
Postsecondary Schools, PUBLIC ADVOCATES (Feb. 14, 2012), 
http://www.publicadvocates.org/document/fact-sheet-californias-oversight-of-
private-postsecondary-schools. 
112 Joint Hearing, supra note 110 (Testimony of Debbie Cochrane, 
Program Director, The Institute for College Access & Success).  Additionally, 
California’s for-profit universities also disproportionately enroll students of 
color. Guillen, supra note 111. African-American and Latino students comprise 
thirty-seven percent of California undergraduates but represent fifty-seven 
percent of those attending for-profit universities. Id. In comparison, African-
American and Latino students comprise twenty-eight percent of U.S. 
undergraduate students, but represent approximately half of all students in the 
for-profit sector. Id. 
113 CAL. EDUC. CODE §§ 94800–94950 (West 2013). 
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institutions in the state. The Bureau oversees three categories of 
higher education institutions: (1) unaccredited institutions; (2) 
nationally accredited institutions; and (3) regionally accredited 
institutions.114  
The Bureau has full authority only over unaccredited 
institutions.115 Unaccredited institutions must meet standards that 
the Bureau sets forth, including meeting minimum standards to 
obtain approval to operate, complying with fair business practices, 
and submitting enrollment agreement and disclosure 
requirements.116 Unaccredited institutions are also subject to the 
Bureau’s investigation, complaint and enforcement procedures.117  
Nationally accredited schools are automatically approved to 
operate in the state, but must still comply with some requirements 
outlined in the Act, including the Bureau’s fair business practice, 
enrollment agreement, and disclosure requirements.118 These 
                                                            
114 Id.  
115 Joint Hearing, supra note 110 (testimony of Jamienne S. Studley, 
President & CEO, Public Advocates Inc.), available at 
http://www.publicadvocates.org/sites/default/files/library/jsshearingtestimony02
-14-12.pdf [hereinafter Studley Testimony]. 
116 Id. at 6. The “minimum operating standards for an institution” include 
that “(a) the content of each educational program can achieve its stated 
objective; (b) the institution maintains specific written standards for student 
admissions . . . ; (c) the facilities . . . are sufficient to enable students to achieve 
the educational program’s goals.” CAL. EDUC. CODE § 94885 (West 2014).  
Disclosure requirements might include disclosures of known limitations of a 
degree program, for example, whether “a graduate of the program will be 
eligible to sit for the applicable licensure exam in California and other states.” 
2011 Legis. Bill Hist. CA A.B. 2296 (2012) (Lexis). 
117 Studley Testimony, supra note 115. The Bureau has a spotty track record 
of actually overseeing postsecondary institutions in California. An investigation 
by the Bay Citizen (a nonprofit news organization committed to investigative 
reporting) revealed that the Bureau “had a backlog of some two hundred 
investigations of “schools accused of hiring unqualified faculty members, 
providing degrees of dubious value and other violations of state education 
code.” Jennifer Gollan, At Vocational Schools, Complaints Mount as Oversight 
Lags, THE BAY CITIZEN (Dec. 8, 2011), https://www.baycitizen.org/news/ 
education/vocational-schools-complaints-mount-lags/.  
118 Studley Testimony, supra note 115, at 6 (citing EDUC. § 94890). 
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institutions are also subject to the Bureau’s investigation, 
complaint, and enforcement procedures.119  
In contrast, regionally accredited institutions are exempt from 
the majority of the Bureau’s provisions and are not required to 
comply with the state’s statutory and regulatory requirements.120 
Private postsecondary institutions with regional accreditation must 
still apply to the Bureau for Private Postsecondary Education.121 
However, the application is only two pages and requests only basic 
information about the institution.122 
California’s exemption of regionally accredited higher 
education institutions is particularly problematic. Notably, 
regionally accredited schools are not required to establish that they 
meet the Bureau’s minimum operating standards or follow the 
consumer protection standards outlined in the Act.123 Further, for 
higher education institutions that do require authorization in 
California, the Bureau has historically been lax about ensuring that 
these schools have approval to operate in the state.124 
                                                            
119 Id.  
120 Id. Regionally accredited schools must comply with the Bureau’s 
provisions that require an institution to provide records to the Bureau before 
closing and with provisions governing payments and procedures related to the 
Student Tuition Recovery Fund.  Id. n.18 (citing EDUC. §§ 94927.5, 94874.1, 
94923–94925). 
121 CAL. CODE REGS. TIT. 5, §71390 (2010).  
122 The application consists of two pages that primarily require basic 
information about the institution, contact person, and owners of the school, a 
copy of current verification of accreditation, and a $750 nonrefundable fee. 
Application for Approval to Operate an Accredited Institution, BUREAU FOR 
PRIVATE POST-SECONDARY EDUC., http://www.bppe.ca.gov/forms_pubs/ 
approval_accredited.pdf (providing the application form).  
123 As a result of this gap in oversight, 266,538 undergraduate students at 
154 schools in California attend institutions not approved or overseen by the 
Bureau. See Studley Testimony, supra note 115, at 7.  
124 Jennifer Golan, More Than 130 Vocational Schools Are Operating 
Without State Approval, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 5, 2012, 
http://www.nytimes.com/2012/04/06/us/california-vocational-schools-operating-
without-approval.html?pagewanted=all. In April 2012, up to 10 percent of 
California’s approved private postsecondary institutions were permitted to 
operate with expired approvals. Id.  Despite their expired approvals, the schools 
were nonetheless listed on the Bureau’s website as approved schools. Id.  
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Thus, California in essence relies on regional accreditation 
agencies to ensure the quality of a majority of its higher education 
institutions. This heavy reliance on just one branch of the 
regulatory triad leads to poor oversight of institutions in the state. 
Moreover, as discussed above, accrediting agencies are not 
designed to handle student complaints.125 Thus, students attending 
a regionally accredited institution in California have little recourse 
within the state’s consumer protection framework for complaints 
of fraud, misrepresentation, or other actions.126  
 
2. Assembly Bill 2296 and Other Improvements 
 
California has recently worked toward improving its oversight 
of for-profit college and vocational school performance. Chapter 
585 of California’s Education Code, in effect since January 2013, 
requires institutions regulated by California’s Bureau for Private 
Postsecondary Education to report certain performance 
measures.127 These measures include salaries of recent graduates 
and the percentages of student borrowers who have defaulted on 
their loans and percentage of students receiving federal student 
loans.128 The statute also requires unaccredited institutions to 
disclose to students their accreditation status and the accreditation 
status of specific programs.129 While these improvements are a step 
                                                            
125 Interview with Betsy Imholz, Director of Special Projects, Consumers 
Union (Apr. 18, 2012) (notes on file with author). “Many people in the field 
think accreditation agencies are being burdened with issues beyond their reach. 
Accreditors have neither the staff nor the legal authority to conduct actual 
investigations. And accreditation reviewers are volunteers, usually from peer 
institutions, who are experts in higher education but not corporate malfeasance.” 
Eric Kelderman, Online Programs Face New Demands from Accreditors, 
CHRON. HIGHER EDUC. (Nov. 6, 2011), http://chronicle.com/article/Online-
Programs-Face-New/129608/. 
126 Studley Testimony, supra note 115, at 16. 
127 2013 Cal. Legis. Serv. Ch. 585 (A.B. 2296) (West). 
128 New California Law Requires Greater Disclosure of For-Profit College 
and Vocational School Performance, PUB. ADVOCATES (Sept. 27, 2012), 
http://www.publicadvocates.org/press-releases/new-california-law-requires-
greater-disclosure-of-for-profit-college-and-vocational-s. 
129 CAL. EDUC. CODE § 94897(p)(1)-(3), amended by 2013 Cal. Legis. Serv. 
Ch. 585 (A.B. 2296) (West). 
570 JOURNAL OF LAW AND POLICY 
in the right direction, the Bureau does not pursue violators who 
operate without state approval, and the new legislation does not 
provide a mechanism for increased enforcement. Consequently, if 
a higher education institution in California does not comply with 
Chapter 585, the Bureau does not have the authority to compel it to 
do so.130  
Despite the recent improvements to California’s oversight of 
higher education institutions, the state’s flawed regulatory structure 
poses many challenges in the distance learning context. For 
example, a California student taking courses from a regionally 
accredited out-of-state higher education institution will have little 
recourse within the consumer protection framework of the state. 
Likewise, an out-of-state student enrolled in a distance learning 
course or program based in California will encounter similar 
difficulties finding recourse.  
 
B. Ohio—Rigorous Oversight 
 
In contrast to California’s lax approach, some states impose 
much stricter requirements on educational institutions. Ohio is one 
such state. In particular, the Chancellor and the Ohio Board of 
Regents (“the Board”) have the authority to approve and review all 
institutions that operate in Ohio, and Ohio’s approval process 
involves a thorough review of the educational programs that higher 
education institutions propose.131  
The primary trigger that causes an institution to require 
authorization to operate in Ohio is when the institution offers 
instruction within the state. If the institution has a physical 
presence in Ohio, then it must also apply for state authorization. 
Accordingly, the most likely candidates for state authorization 
include in-state institutions, for-profit out-of-state schools, and 
                                                            
130 Michael Coleman, Chapter 585: A Renewed Effort to Restore Integrity 
to California’s Vocational and Postsecondary Educational Institutions, 44 
MCGEORGE L. REV. 608, 618–19 (2013) (providing an in-depth analysis of 
Chapter 585’s changes to the California Education Code and their likely 
impact).  
131 Interview with Shane DeGarmo, Program Approval/Institutional 
Authorization, Ohio Bd. of Regents (Oct. 18, 2012) [hereinafter DeGarmo 
Interview] (notes on file with author). 
PROTECTING STUDENTS, PROTECTING CONSUMERS  571 
established off-site schools that offer education in Ohio. As a 
result, the Board has authority over the approval of institutions that 
award diplomas, offer instruction in certain enumerated fields, or 
simply offer courses.132 Institutions that provide distance education 
to Ohio residents must also apply for state authorization if their 
online program contains a component such as an internship, 
student teaching opportunity, or clinical experience that a student 
completes in Ohio.133 Further, solicitation or direct recruitment of 
Ohio residents through mail or agents triggers the authorization 
process.134  
                                                            
132 This requirement is pursuant to Ohio Revised Code Title XVII, Chapter 
1713.01 and 1713.02: 
 As used in sections 1713.01 to 1713.06 of the Revised Code, 
‘institution’ includes: 
(A) Any nonprofit university, college, academy, school, or 
other institution, incorporated or unincorporated, that does any 
of the following: 
(1) Awards or intends to award diplomas for the completion of 
a course designed to prepare students to be eligible for 
certification as registered nurses; 
(2) Offers or intends to offer instruction in the arts and 
sciences, teacher education, business administration, 
engineering, philosophy, literature, fine arts, law, medicine, 
nursing, social work, theology and other recognized academic 
and professional fields of study, and awards or intends to 
award degrees for fulfilling requirements of academic work 
beyond high school; 
(3) Offers or intends to offer a course or courses in any of the 
areas described by division (A)(1) or (2) of this section that 
are applicable to requirements for a diploma or degree named 
in either such division. 
OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 1713.01(A) (West 2013). The Ohio Revised Code 
(which governs program approval) also applies to “any college, university, or 
school that offers or intends to offer one or more courses . . . that is operated by 
another state or a subdivision or other governmental entity of another state.” Id. 
§ 1713.01(B). 
133 DeGarmo Interview, supra note 131. 
134 For out-of-state institutions offering distance education programs, state 
authorization is required if “the institution maintains a brick and mortar presence 
in Ohio; the online program contains a component (e.g. student teaching, clinical 
placement, practicum) that will be completed in Ohio; or the institution solicits 
Ohio residents for its programs (for-profit institutions only).” Academic 
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Ohio’s current model for state authorization consists of an 
involved review process. Schools seeking authorization in Ohio 
must complete template forms and submit a first-time application 
fee and a fee to cover the cost of review.135 Schools must then 
begin developing program proposals, which are subject to approval 
by the Board.136 The Board only begins the review process once 
the institution has submitted its program proposals.137 
In reviewing a proposal, the Board assembles a team with the 
appropriate expertise needed to review the proposed program. For 
example, teams may have experts to assess library resources, and 
may also have experts geared towards certain subject matter, or 
with a more general expertise in the case of undergraduate 
programs.138 The review generally takes place over a three-week 
period and includes a site visit and meetings with the institution’s 
president, chief academic and financial officers, faculty, librarians, 
and student support personnel.139  
The review team also creates a report, which it shares with the 
institution on the final morning of the site visit.140 The institution 
drafts a response to the team’s report, which it sends back to the 
Board.141 If the school is approved, the Board will write a 
summary of the request, provide a ten-day public comment 
period,142 and then pass the request to the Chancellor for review 
and approval.143 
As a result of the 2010 Online State Authorization Rule, Ohio 
is now in the process of creating a new process to deal with the 
                                                            
Program Approval, OHIO HIGHER ED, https://www.ohiohighered.org/academic-
program-approval (last visited Feb. 17, 2015). 
135 DeGarmo Interview, supra note 131. 
136 Id. 
137 Id. 
138 Id. 
139 Id. 
140 Id.  
141 Id. 
142 For a list of current proposals posted awaiting public comments, see 
Proposals Posted for Public Comment or Awaiting the Chancellor’s Signature, 
OHIO HIGHER ED, https://www.ohiohighered.org/academic-program-
approval/programs-pending (last visited Feb. 16, 2015). 
143 DeGarmo Interview, supra note 131. 
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influx of requests resulting from the state authorization 
requirements.144 The Board recognized that the academic program 
approval process is time-consuming and complex for both the 
institutions and the Board.145 The Board is thus introducing a new, 
streamlined approval process. This process will involve verifying 
that an institution has appropriate approval from its home state and 
will ask institutions to verify their accreditation status, among 
other steps. The new process will reduce the approval time from 
twelve to twenty months down to nine.146  
 Ohio’s approach also affords consumer protection to students. 
For the consumer protection of students who are Ohio residents, 
the Board’s approach depends on the type of institution involved in 
the consumer’s complaint. For example, if the complaint stems 
from a student’s relationship with a nonprofit institution, the Board 
records basic information about the complaint if it is also an issue 
that is normally handled through the institution’s grievance 
procedures.147 In these cases, if the Board believes that the issue is 
one that can be addressed through the institution’s grievance 
procedures, then the Board will encourage the student to work 
through those avenues.148 On the other hand, if the complaint 
relates to an issue directly relating to Ohio’s program approval 
process, (for example, an alleged violation of an actual 
                                                            
144 Ohio received approximately 900 applications following the passage of 
the 2010 State Authorization Rule. Id. 
145 Id. 
146 Regents Team Overhauls Key Review Process to Quicken Turnaround 
and Ensure Quality, LEAN OHIO (Mar. 16, 2012), 
http://lean.ohio.gov/Results/BoardofRegentsProgramApprovalMarch2012.aspx. 
The new process also reduces the number of steps required to gain state 
authorization in Ohio by 65 percent (from 175 steps to 62 steps). Id. Institutions 
will have a single point of entry to apply for state authorization, will be able to 
compare Ohio’s standards with those of their home state, and will have a mentor 
at the state agency who will serve as a single contact point throughout the 
program approval process. Id. For the Board, this streamlined process is 
projected to save the state $2500 per institution reviewed. Id. Further, the new 
system will have a centralized information management system that will allow 
staff the ability to quickly and easily retrieve information on past interactions 
with an institution. Id.  
147 DeGarmo Interview, supra note 131. 
148 Id. 
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requirement of the approval process) then the Board will likely 
take a more corrective stance and communicate directly with the 
institution.149 
For student complaints related to for-profit institutions, the 
Board advises students to take complaints to the State Board of 
Career Colleges and Schools (the “State Board”).150 The State 
Board “monitors and regulates Ohio’s private post-secondary 
career colleges and schools to ensure compliance with minimum 
standards” established by Ohio Revised Code Chapter 3332, which 
covers careers colleges and schools.151 It allows students to file 
complaints against registered schools.152 In response to a 
complaint, the State Board conducts an initial investigation of the 
complaint to determine if a violation occurred.153 Upon such a 
finding, the State Board “may issue a formal complaint or it may 
endeavor to eliminate such practices by informal methods of 
conference, conciliation, and persuasion.”154 
If a student complaint results from a distance education 
program that has an experiential component (for example, student 
teaching, clinical placement, or practicum) that will be completed 
in Ohio, the Board has different approaches depending on the 
student complaint.155 For example, if the student has an issue with 
the degree program offered by the out-of-state institution, but not 
with the experiential component, the student will be directed to the 
appropriate higher education authority in that institution’s home 
state.156 However, if the complaint arises from the experiential 
                                                            
149 Id. 
150 Id. 
151 OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 3332.01 (West 2014); About Us – General 
Information, OHIO STATE BD. OF CAREER COLLS. & SCHS., http://scr.ohio.gov/ 
(last visited Feb. 16, 2015). 
152 Filing a Complaint, OHIO STATE BD. OF CAREER COLLS. & SCHS., 
http://scr.ohio.gov/ConsumerInformation/FilingaComplaint.aspx (last visited 
Feb. 16, 2015). 
153 Id.  
154 Id. 
155 DeGarmo Interview, supra note 131. 
156 Id. 
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component, the Board will investigate and attempt to resolve the 
complaint.157 
 
C. Comparative Analysis of California’s and Ohio’s 
Regulatory Structures 
 
California’s exemption model results in a lax oversight 
structure that relies solely on the accrediting agency prong of the 
regulatory triad as a means of state authorization. In contrast, 
Ohio’s authorization process, in both its current and proposed 
form, is significantly more robust. 
A comparison between the two systems highlights the huge 
variance in regulatory standards. Ohio’s more stringent 
authorization process renders it more likely that in-state institutions 
will offer a higher quality education. In contrast, California’s 
system does not ensure a high quality education for its students. 
California’s exemption model means that most higher education 
institutions in the state are not subject to the entirety of 
California’s regulatory authority, but can achieve state 
authorization through only regional accreditation. The widely 
variant state authorization processes and consumer protection 
standards in each state highlight the need for a comprehensive 
regulatory scheme that simplifies the state authorization process 
while adequately protecting the interests of student consumers.  
 
IV.  RECOMMENDATIONS 
 
This Part first outlines the genesis of regional interstate 
compacts and current efforts to recruit states into these compacts in 
order to deal with the regulatory problems discussed in Part II. 
This Part next explores flaws with the regional interstate compacts. 
Finally, it proposes an improved regulatory scheme that ties Title 
IV federal funding to adequate consumer protection mechanisms in 
states, thereby providing student consumers with sufficient 
recourse against their higher education institutions. 
 
                                                            
157 Id. 
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A. Regional Interstate Compacts 
 
A promising avenue for change in the industry is the creation 
of interstate compacts, which are agreements among two or more 
states, enacted into law in each state, and designed to address a 
common problem. The Presidents’ Forum, a collaboration of 
accredited national institutions engaged in distance learning, began 
the process of creating an interstate compact in 2010.158 The 
Forum’s objectives mainly focus on reducing impediments to the 
spread of online education.159 The Forum identified the structural 
impediments in state regulatory processes as a main roadblock to 
online education.160 The Forum critiqued state approval processes 
as inhibiting institutions from offering regional or national distance 
learning.161 Specifically, the Forum cited the inability of distance 
learning institutions to afford the “considerable staff and resources 
necessary to respond individually to each of the fifty states’ 
requirements.”162 Given the differing approaches to state 
regulations, the Forum proposed a cooperative national effort to 
effect change in this area.163 
In September 2010, the Forum convened state authorization 
officials and representatives from the Council on State 
Governments (“CSG”)164 to create a Multi-State Reciprocity Task 
Team (“Task Team”).165 The Task Team reviewed the current state 
                                                            
158 PAUL H. SHIFFMAN, JAMES W. HALL, & ALAN L. CONTRERAS, TOWARD 
A MODEL TEMPLATE UPON WHICH AN INTERSTATE RECIPROCITY COMPACT OF 
COLLEGE AND UNIVERSITY PROGRAM AUTHORIZATION COULD BE BASED: A 
WHITE PAPER OF THE PRESIDENTS’ FORUM 1 (2011), available at 
https://confluence.umassonline.net/download/attachments/62523168/SARA_To
ward_A_Model_Template.pdf.   
159 Id. at 3. 
160 Id.  
161 Id.  
162 Id. at 6. 
163 Id. 
164 Id. at 7 (“The Council on State Governments . . . is a non-partisan, 
nonprofit organization that represents every elected and appointed official in the 
three branches of state government in the fifty states and U.S. territories[, 
which] offers guidance and technical assistance in dealing with interstate 
compacts and other interstate agreements.”).  
165 Id.  
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regulatory approval procedures and the “processes and institutional 
data that states indicate are necessary in order to validate the 
credibility of an institution for the purpose of granting authority to 
operate in a state.”166 The CSG concluded that in order to promote 
reciprocal strategies among states, its regulatory authorization 
officials needed to create and define a common template, policy, 
and enforcement strategy that was closely aligned with the need for 
review and revision of state regulations.167 The CSG then drafted a 
model interstate compact.168 
The proposed model interstate compact depends on regional 
interstate compacts that the four regional higher education 
organizations have already created: the Western Interstate 
Commission for Higher Education (“WICHE”), the New England 
Board of Higher Education, the Midwestern Higher Education 
Compact, and the Southern Regional Education Board. These 
higher education organizations encourage resource sharing and 
facilitate action among higher education systems.169 Currently, the 
four regional higher education organizations are creating distinct 
interstate compacts and enlisting the states within their jurisdiction 
to join.170 Authorization by one of the four regional interstate 
compacts would provide a higher education institution with the 
ability to operate in all states in that compact.171  
The Commission on the Regulation of Postsecondary Distance 
Education (“the Commission”) builds upon the work of the Forum 
and the CSG.172 The Commission was established to “develop and 
                                                            
166 Id. 
167 Id. 
168 Interview with Alan Contreras, Member, Presidents’ Forum (Apr. 18, 
2012). 
169 ADVANCING ACCESS, supra note 12, at 17. 
170 See id. These four regional organizations are typically referred to as 
compacts, but for the sake of clarity will be referred to as organizations 
throughout this Article. 
171 ADVANCING ACCESS, supra note 12, at 17. 
172 The Commission is composed of former U.S. Secretary of Education 
Richard Riley and twenty other higher education leaders invited by the 
Association of Public and Land-Grant Universities and the State Higher 
Education Executive Officers to “explore the regulation of postsecondary 
distance education.” Id. at 3. The Commission was convened in May 2012 to 
“develop and provide recommendations that will address the costs and 
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provide recommendations that will address the costs and 
inefficiencies faced by postsecondary institutions that must comply 
with multiple (often inconsistent) state laws and regulations.”173 
The four regional higher education organizations will use the 
Commission’s policy paper as a guide for creating four distinct 
regional interstate compacts.174 
The Commission expanded upon the work of the CSG and the 
Forum in its 2013 policy paper, Advancing Access Through 
Regulatory Reform.175 The paper focused on using the four 
regional higher education organizations to create distinct regional 
interstate compacts, overseen by a national coordinating board.176 
The paper emphasized the importance of accreditation and 
institutional quality, consumer protection, and institutional 
financial responsibility.177  
The regional interstate compacts create a comprehensive set of 
standards for higher education institutions; the goal of the creators 
of the compacts is to implement standards that will appeal to a 
broad spectrum of states, including those with the most rigorous 
standards for higher education institutions.178 In order to join the 
                                                            
inefficiencies faced by postsecondary institutions that must comply with 
multiple (often inconsistent) state laws and regulations as they endeavor to 
provide educational opportunities to students in multiple state jurisdictions.” Id. 
173 Id. 
174 Interview with Alan Contreras, State Authorization Reciprocity 
Agreement Coordinator, National Council/WICHE (Oct. 8, 2013). I spoke with 
Alan Contreras several times in the course of my research. His job title has 
changed since my first conversation with him—the citations reflect his job title 
at the time of the interview.  
175 ADVANCING ACCESS, supra note 12, at 1.  
176 Id. at 4. The paper discusses that the regional higher education compacts 
are “well-positioned to manage state participation in the agreement since they 
have strong, existing relationships with states and institutions and [have] 
demonstrated experience in managing interstate activities.” Id. 
177 Id. at 4–5. The Commission’s decision to use the four existing regional 
higher education organizations rather than create a single national structure was 
based in part on the belief that creating an entirely new national structure would 
be “too time- and resource-intensive and potentially too bureaucratic to be 
viable.” Id.  
178 Interview with Alan Contreras, Member, Presidents’ Forum (Apr. 18, 
2012). A template of a model interstate compact provides an overview of 
categories and areas that the interstate compact will address. These include (1) 
PROTECTING STUDENTS, PROTECTING CONSUMERS  579 
regional interstate compacts, a state must take on the obligation of 
overseeing institutions located within its boundaries and will have 
the authority to oversee the “in-state activities of institutions that 
have physical presence in its borders.”179 Physical presence is 
defined as the “ongoing occupation of an actual physical location 
for instructional purposes or the maintenance of an administrative 
office to facilitate instruction in the state.”180 As of August 2014, 
nine states have joined regional interstate compacts:  three states in 
the Midwest region and six states in the Western region. Joining 
one of the regional interstate compacts indicates that the state has 
adopted the appropriate legislation to facilitate compliance with the 
requirements of the interstate compact.181 
Successful regional interstate compacts will provide higher 
education institutions with solutions to many of the problems that 
were outlined in Part II.C. If enough states join regional interstate 
compacts, this will reduce the need for higher education 
institutions to acquire authorization in each state in which they 
                                                            
Institutional Status: Charter, Regional Accreditation, State Approvals; (2) 
Leadership, Governance and Management; (3) Faculty Qualifications; (4) 
Curricula; (5) Credit Award; (6) Admissions; (7) Student Services; (8) 
Institutional Information, Marketing, Recruitment; (9) Registrar services and 
Student records; (10) Institutional Operational and Student Outcome Data; (11) 
Finances, Tuition and Fees; and (12) Institutional Infrastructure in Support of 
Student Study. Id. 
179 ADVANCING ACCESS, supra note 12, at 17–18. One of the most tangible 
benefits to states that will result from joining the compacts will be a reduced 
number of applications from higher education institutions. However, this 
decrease in time and resources spent processing applications will be 
accompanied by a reduction in fees generated from these applications. Interview 
with Alan Contreras (Oct. 8, 2013), supra note 174.  
180 ADVANCING ACCESS, supra note 12, at 15. Further, “[f]or purposes of 
the interstate reciprocity agreement, institutions delivering pure distance 
education courses and conducting no other activities in a state should not be 
deemed to be physically present.” Id.  
181 ADVANCING ACCESS, supra note 12, at 18. The National Council for 
State Reciprocity Agreements provides an updated list on the state-level process 
for introducing and passing cogent legislation. Alan Contreras Interview with 
Alan Contreras (Oct. 8, 2013), supra note 174. The states in the Western region 
that have joined are Alaska, Colorado, Idaho, Montana, Nevada, and 
Washington. Id. The states in the Midwestern region are Indiana, Nebraska, and 
North Dakota. Id. 
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offer distance learning courses, thereby lessening their regulatory 
burden.182 
 
 B. The Compacts and Consumer Protection 
 
A key issue facing the interstate compact model is whether 
states with widely differing regulatory standards can belong to the 
same compact, especially given their potentially differing 
standards for consumer protection. Under the current proposal, a 
higher education institution will be subject to the state regulatory 
authority of one state—the state in which it is based. Thus, the 
state in which the institution is based will deal with any consumer 
protection issues. In order to join a regional interstate compact, a 
state will be required to have a mechanism in place to receive, 
respond to, and resolve student complaints.183 For example, if both 
Nebraska and Oregon are members of an interstate compact and an 
Oregon higher education institution provides a distance learning 
course to a Nebraska resident, then the Nebraska student’s 
complaint would be directed to Oregon’s state consumer protection 
agency.184 This mechanism is necessary in order to ensure that 
students have a clear avenue for the resolution of any complaints 
and that states are adequately prepared to deal with any issues that 
might arise at an institution located within its boundaries.  
The regional interstate compact model thus raises a number of 
issues relating to states’ consumer protection frameworks. One 
issue is whether states with subpar consumer protection laws will 
be permitted to enter the regional interstate compacts. 
                                                            
182 Hill Interview, supra note 15; see also Press Release, WCET, Colleges 
Comply with and Avoid State Authorization Regulations (May 2014), 
http://wcet.wiche.edu/wcet/docs/state-approval/StateAuthorizationWhatAre 
InstitutionsDoingPRMay2014.pdf  (explaining that reasons higher education 
institutions choose not to apply for authorization in a state include that “costs are 
too high, they are waiting on the emerging State Authorization Reciprocity 
Agreement, the institution is collecting information, and the college is waiting 
for more clarification on regulations”). 
183 Hill Interview, supra note 15. 
184 Id.  
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Conversations with members of the Forum and WICHE indicate 
that these states will not be able to join the regional interstate 
compacts.185 The Commission’s paper states that “a prerequisite 
for state participation [in the interstate compact] . . . will be a clear 
process for receiving and resolving consumer complaints.”186 
California was cited as a state with insufficient consumer 
protection laws such that it would not be invited to join a regional 
interstate compact.187  
The juxtaposition of California’s and Ohio’s processes for 
authorizing higher education institutions exemplifies one of the 
main problems facing the interstate compacts: whether two states 
with widely differing standards for authorization can participate in 
the same compact. In all likelihood, states with stringent state 
authorization processes (such as Ohio) would not agree to enter an 
interstate compact with states that have less regulation (such as 
California). States with laws like California’s would therefore not 
be allowed into the compact.188 Furthermore, Ohio’s trifurcated 
system for dealing with consumer complaints is far more complex 
than California’s current consumer protection scheme. 
Accordingly, it seems unlikely that the interstate compacts would 
include states with such differing standards.  
The regional interstate compacts, though a step in the right 
direction for streamlining a fragmented regulatory system, contain 
several flaws. While an interstate compact system will be 
beneficial for states that are eligible to join and will streamline the 
state authorization process for higher education institutions, the 
compact system will not include states with insufficient regulatory 
structures. Perhaps more problematically, the interstate compacts 
leaves students who reside in under-regulated states with little or 
no recourse in the face of violations by higher education 
institutions. 
 
                                                            
185 Id. 
186 ADVANCING ACCESS, supra note 12, at 5. 
187 Hill Interview, supra note 15. 
188 Id. 
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C. Solving the Problem of Fragmentation with Federal 
Intervention and National Consumer Protection Standards 
 
A more inclusive and effective solution would involve the 
federal government playing a greater role in the regulatory 
framework by establishing a national standard of consumer 
protection for higher education institutions. As demonstrated by 
the adoption of the 2010 Online State Authorization Rule, the 
federal government has previously shown a willingness to 
intercede in the field of education by attaching strings to Title IV 
federal funding. The federal government can and should do more 
to protect the rights of students as consumers and a system that ties 
federal funding to adequate consumer protections would establish a 
framework for protecting student consumers.  
 
1. Tying Title IV Funding to Consumer Protection 
 
The federal government should set a new requirement for for-
profit distance learning institutions that seek Title IV funds: the 
institutions may only operate in states that meet a federal standard 
of consumer protection. If states are encouraged to adhere to a 
heightened, federally-imposed standard, then students will have a 
better chance of being protected regardless of where their higher 
education institution is based.  
The system would create a national standard for consumer 
protection regulations and encourage states to create or designate a 
bureau to implement that standard. The individual state bureaus 
could be modeled on the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau 
(“CFPB”), an independent federal agency charged with regulating 
consumer protection in the realm of financial services.189 Like the 
                                                            
189 The CFPB was established by the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and 
Consumer Protection Act of 2010, and President Barack Obama appointed the 
first director in January 2012. About Us, CONSUMER FIN. PROT. BUREAU, 
http://www.consumerfinance.gov/the-bureau/ (last visited Feb. 16, 2015). 
According to section 1021 of the new legislation, the CFPB is to “implement 
and, where applicable, enforce Federal consumer financial law consistently for 
the purpose of ensuring that all consumers have access to markets for consumer 
financial products and services and that markets for consumer financial products 
and services are fair, transparent, and competitive.” Theresa A. Gabaldon, Half-
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CFPB, the state bureaus could write rules, enforce consumer 
financial protection laws, and educate consumers about abusive 
financial practices.190 The CFPB also gathers and analyzes 
information to better understand consumers, financial service 
providers, and consumer financial markets, a role that state bureaus 
could take on as well.191  
The proposed system would depend on the consumer 
protection laws of individual states rather than federal consumer 
protection laws, but would strive to provide a similar level of 
protection to student consumers as the CFPB provides to 
consumers of financial services. As such, states would be 
encouraged to have a bureau of consumer protection that would (1) 
receive and follow up on student complaints; (2) provide students 
with comprehensive information about higher education 
institutions and educate students about loan agreements; and (3) 
expose and investigate deceptive practices by higher education 
institutions located within the state.  
 
a. Complaint Process 
 
A state bureau of consumer protection complaint process 
would function analogously to the CFPB’s complaint process. The 
CFPB allows consumers to submit complaints about any of eleven 
financial products and loans, ranging from bank accounts to 
vehicle loans.192 Consumers may submit a complaint in which they 
describe the issue they are experiencing and provide information 
about the company.193 The CFPB reviews the complaint and works 
with the company to provide a response to the consumer.194 The 
                                                            
A-Cup Better Than None: A Pragmatic Approach to Preventing the Abuse of 
Financial Consumers, 81 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 929, 936 (2013) (quoting Dodd-
Frank Act § 1021(a), 124 Stat. at 1979–80). 
190 See CONSUMER FIN. PROT. BUREAU, About Us, supra note 189.   
191 Id.  
192 Submit a Complaint, CONSUMER FIN. PROT. BUREAU, 
http://www.consumerfinance.gov/complaint/ (last visited Feb. 16, 2015).  
193 Id.  
194 The Complaint Process, CONSUMER FIN. PROT. BUREAU, 
http://www.consumerfinance.gov/complaint/process/ (last visited Feb. 16, 
2015). 
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company must review the consumer’s complaint and inform the 
CFPB and the consumer as to what steps it will take to resolve the 
consumer’s complaint.195 The consumer then reviews the 
company’s response, and provides feedback to the CFPB.196 Using 
the aggregated data compiled by consumer complaints, the CFPB 
is able to analyze which business practices pose risks to consumers 
and share the data it compiles with law enforcement and federal 
agencies.197  
A mechanism for handling student complaints about higher 
education institutions would function analogously. A state 
consumer protection bureau should provide students with a forum 
for filing a complaint and should work with the higher education 
institution to resolve the complaints. By receiving student 
complaints from across the state, a state consumer protection 
bureau would be able to understand which higher education 
institutions are particularly problematic and would be able to focus 
its regulatory efforts on those institutions. Aggregated data from 
student complaints would guide future rulemaking and help states 
understand how to better enforce consumer protection laws. 
Currently, in some states, student complaints are directed toward 
accrediting agencies, which, as detailed in Part I.C, are ill-
equipped to handle them.198 A state consumer protection bureau 
that handles all student complaints about higher education 
institutions in the state would streamline consumer complaints and 
allow for easy aggregation of data. 
 
b. Consumer Education 
 
The CFPB also provides education for consumers. It provides 
information targeted to students, the elderly, service members, and 
veterans.199 A state consumer protection bureau should, like the 
                                                            
195 Id.  
196 Id. 
197 Id.  
198 FOR PROFIT HIGHER EDUCATION, supra note 54, at 144–46. 
199 Financial Protection for Older Americans, CONSUMER FIN. PROT. 
BUREAU, http://www.consumerfinance.gov/older-americans/ (last visited Feb. 
16, 2015); Information for Servicemembers, CONSUMER FIN. PROT. BUREAU, 
http://www.consumerfinance.gov/servicemembers/ (last visited Feb. 16, 2015); 
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CFPB, provide general information about for-profit distance 
learning institutions, but should also go further and provide 
students with the specific performance metrics of higher education 
institutions within the state.200 California Education Code § 
94929.5, detailed in Part III.A, provides a model for states. It 
requires higher education institutions to report accurate 
information about their performance.201 Students must be able to 
see the salaries of a school’s graduates, the percentage of a 
school’s borrowers who default on their loans, and the 
accreditation status of the school and its programs.202 Additional 
measures that might be useful to students include cost of 
attendance and related expenses, policies related to refunds, 
student withdrawal rates, and requirements for the “return of Title 
IV grants or loan assistance.”203 State consumer protection bureaus 
could compile this information about for-profit distance learning 
institutions within their boundaries and ensure that this information 
is available and easily accessible to students and parents. As in 
California, this may require the passage of state laws that require 
higher education institutions to report such performance measures 
to the state consumer protection bureaus.  
                                                            
Students and Young Americans, CONSUMER FIN. PROT. BUREAU, 
http://www.consumerfinance.gov/students/ (last visited Feb. 16, 2015).  
200 This would help students interested in for-profit universities gather 
information about them, because “[u]nlike selective higher education 
institutions, where third party rankings (e.g., U.S. News & World Report and 
college guidebooks) serve as a proxy for quality, the information available 
concerning FPCUs [for-profit colleges and universities] and other nonselective 
higher education institutions is sparse and often unreliable.” Omari Scott 
Simmons, For-Profits and the Market Paradox, 48 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 333, 
352 (2013) (quoting Michael Stratford, Senate Report Paints a Damning 
Portrait of For-Profit Higher Education, CHRON. HIGHER EDUC. (July 30, 
2012), http://chronicle.com/article/A-Damning-Portrait-of/133253/). 
201 CAL. EDUC. CODE § 94929.5 (West 2013); see also Press Release, 
Public Advocates, New California Law Requires Greater Disclosure of For-
Profit College and Vocational School Performance (Sept. 27, 2012), 
http://www.publicadvocates.org/sites/default/files/press_releases/ab_2296_press
_release_9-27-12.pdf (“Effective January 1, 2013, those higher education 
institutions regulated by California’s Bureau for Private Postsecondary 
Education (BPPE) must report accurate information about their performance.”). 
202 EDUC. § 94929.5. 
203 ADVANCING ACCESS, supra note 12, at 25. 
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c. Institution Supervision 
 
The CFPB also focuses on supervising institutions to ensure 
their compliance with financial laws and to prevent deceptive 
practices.204 In order to accomplish these goals, the CFPB focuses 
on sharing information about deceptive practices with partners in 
local, state, and federal law enforcement.205 Further, the CFPB 
strives to file or settle enforcement actions within two years of 
opening an investigation in order to increase deterrence and 
“provide[] consumers with greater protections of law.”206 
State consumer protection bureaus should work with state law 
enforcement bodies to monitor higher education institutions with a 
history of deceptive practices. As outlined in Part II, even states 
with regulations regarding reporting or complaints related to 
deceptive practices sometimes lack the resources to enforce 
compliance. A key provision of the proposed federal regulation 
would be adequate measures to ensure compliance with state laws.  
 
2. Benefits of Proposed Regulation and Interaction 
with Interstate Compact 
 
An advantage of the proposed regulation is that state consumer 
protection laws would work together with the regional interstate 
compacts. For example, if California improved its consumer 
protection framework such that it met nationally mandated 
standards, it could join a regional interstate compact provided that 
it adopted legislation such that it was in compliance with the 
requirements of the interstate compact.207 The minimum standards 
                                                            
204 CONSUMER FIN. PROT. BUREAU, CONSUMER FINANCIAL PROTECTION 
BUREAU STRATEGIC PLAN 12–14 (2013), available at 
http://files.consumerfinance.gov/f/strategic-plan.pdf. 
205 Id. at 15. 
206 Id. 
207 Interview with Alan Contreras, State Authorization Reciprocity 
Agreement Coordinator, National Council/WICHE (Oct. 8, 2013). The states in 
the western region that are expected to have sufficient regulations in place and 
are prepared to join the WICHE regional compact are Alaska, Washington, 
Idaho, Colorado, and Hawaii. Id. Other states across the United States that are 
expected to join other regional compacts include Nebraska, Iowa, Indiana, 
Vermont, Michigan, and Kansas. Id. Thus far, the states that are prepared to join 
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of consumer protection for states will work in conjunction with the 
regional interstate compacts, since the regional interstate compacts 
provide a service to higher education institutions as they reduce the 
transaction costs of becoming authorized in more than one state. 
These reduced transaction costs mean that interstate compacts 
allow a variety of institutions, both large and small, to procure 
authorization to operate in multiple states.  Typically, the 
institutions most able to operate in more than one state are large 
institutions with the ability to dedicate resources specifically to 
procuring authorization to operate in different states.   
The proposed system has several advantages over a regulatory 
framework that consists merely of the regional interstate compacts. 
First, tying Title IV federal funding to consumer protection will 
encourage states to increase their consumer protections 
frameworks in an effort to encourage for-profit distance learning 
institutions to locate within their boundaries. This will create an 
incentive for states to ensure they are in compliance with national 
consumer protection standards, and perhaps create competition 
among states to quickly improve consumer protection. 
Second, tying Title IV federal funding to consumer protection 
will incentivize for-profit distance learning institutions to locate in 
states that provide an adequate safety net for student consumers. 
For-profit universities typically have a strong lobbying presence 
both at the federal and state levels.208 For-profit universities that 
wish to remain in certain states would likely utilize their strong 
lobbying power to demand higher consumer protection within the 
states in which they are located.209  
                                                            
are typically low-population states that do not have a large number of higher 
education institutions located within them. Id.  
208 See generally David Halperin, The Perfect Lobby: How One Industry 
Captured Washington, DC, THE NATION (Apr. 3, 2014), 
http://www.thenation.com/article/179161/perfect-lobby-how-one-industry-
captured-washington-dc (exploring the extensive lobbying efforts of for-profit 
colleges). 
209 For-profit universities have previously demonstrated their lobbying 
clout. In 2011, proposed stricter regulations on federal funding to for-profit 
universities provoked a “ferocious response” and resulted in weaker final 
regulations than those the Obama administration had previously sought. Eric 
Lichtblau, With Lobbying Blitz, For-Profit Colleges Diluted New Rules, N.Y. 
TIMES, Dec. 29, 2011, http://www.nytimes.com/2011/12/10/us/politics/for-
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3. Potential Drawbacks of the Proposed Rule 
 
One of the problems posed by this type of federal regulation is 
that higher education institutions based in states without adequate 
consumer protection frameworks may be forced to relocate in 
order to receive Title IV federal funds, which could result in huge 
costs to the higher education institution. However, much like the 
federal Online State Authorization Rule of 2010, the introduction 
and enforcement of the rule could be staggered.210 A provision of 
the federal Program Integrity Rules—while introduced in 2010—
was not enforced until July 2014.211 The four-year grace period 
provided higher education institutions with sufficient time to 
comply with the new regulations. Similarly, the proposed federal 
regulation could have a grace period that would provide states with 
sufficient time to pass legislation to create consumer protection 
frameworks that meet national standards. Moreover, a grace period 
would allow higher education institutions to either pressure states 
to change consumer protection standards, or provide institutions 
with sufficient time to relocate to a state that meets the federal 
standards. 
Another potential issue that may arise is that states may not be 
incentivized to increase consumer protection beyond the federally 
mandated standards. In this scenario, by setting a minimum 
consumer protection standard, states will, at best, only comply with 
the minimum standards. As a result, states will not be motivated to 
strive for excellence with regard to consumer protection for 
students and motivation to innovate or provide robust protection 
beyond minimum standards will be lacking. However, this could 
be remedied by providing additional funds for states whose 
consumer protection standards surpass national standards.  
Much like the Online State Authorization Rule, the proposed 
regulation will allow states to retain autonomy and simultaneously 
                                                            
profit-college-rules-scaled-back-after-lobbying.html. The regulation proposed 
by this Article will ideally utilize the for-profit’s strong lobbying presence for 
good—to increase the consumer protection safeguards for consumers in states.  
210 Kelly Field, Colleges Get More Time to Comply with New Rule on State 
Authorization, CHRON. HIGHER EDUC. (Apr. 20, 2011), http://chronicle.com/ 
article/Colleges-Get-More-Time-to/127216/. 
211 Id. 
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improve outcomes for students. States that do not prioritize or are 
not currently home to for-profit distance learning institutions will 
not be compelled to improve their consumer protection 
frameworks for student consumers. Conversely, states with a large 
presence of for-profit distance learning institutions will prioritize 
meeting the nationally mandated consumer protection standards to 
encourage these institutions to locate to or remain within their 
borders.  
 
CONCLUSION 
 
The federal government’s Online State Authorization Rule 
brings into sharp focus the snarled nature of state authorization of 
higher education institutions offering distance learning courses. 
The complications associated with state authorization additionally 
affect the recourse available to students wronged by higher 
education institutions. The regional interstate compacts, if 
successful, will streamline the state authorization process for 
higher education institutions. However, the compacts largely focus 
on aiding education institutions and do little to ensure a consumer 
protection framework that adequately protects students. As the 
case studies of California and Ohio exemplify, states have widely 
differing standards and processes for authorization and levels of 
consumer protection. Because the regional interstate compacts will 
leave out states where regulation is most lax, they may not help the 
students who most need protection.  
To remedy this, this Article proposes increased federal 
regulation in the form of a federal rule that ties Title IV federal 
funding for for-profit higher education institutions offering 
distance education to states’ consumer protection frameworks. This 
proposed regulation would encourage states to increase consumer 
protection for students and simultaneously encourage for-profit 
higher education institutions offering distance education to locate 
in states with consumer protection schemes that meet a national 
standard. These requirements will ensure both a higher quality 
education for students and appropriate protections for students in 
the case of improprieties by higher education institutions. 
Moreover, the proposed regulations would function in concert with 
the regional interstate compacts, leading to a regulatory framework 
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that, in addition to aiding higher education institutions, protects 
student consumers. 
